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The outlook for credit managers

January in review

Convertible arbitrageurs should do well in a volatile market  
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Feature Story
 
The outlook for credit managers and the distressed cycle
 


So far, most of the rout in the debt markets has been linked to the US subprime mortgage debacle. Increasingly, however, many hedge funds are betting there is far worse to come for the corporate debt market as well as indicated by the distressed fund assets awaiting investment. Richard Branson in his last set of interviews when he was following Gordon Brown around China must have used the word distressed over 5 times in a 2 minute conversation with a journalist. Admittedly they were discussing the very specific matter of the future bailout of Northern Rock, but the “D” word is clearly out there.

Hedge fund managers and the trading desks of some of the savviest firms on Wall Street are expecting the downturn in the corporate debt market as well as most other credit markets to continue. A big part of their bet is that bonds will perform far worse than in previous meltdowns, because financial engineering has created so many layers of debt on top of unsecured bonds, which are the last debt to get paid in the event of a default. Take the credit derivatives market for instance: CDO and CLO spreads have widened as banks and insurance companies, the traditional buyers of the asset class, have disappeared from the market. Active participants in the sector such as the monolines, which write protection on AAA tranches of CLOs, have been hard hit by their sub-prime exposure. "You take the funded/wrapper trade out of the equation and there are far fewer buyers of AAA CLO tranches," says one analyst I spoke with recently.

Yet there are also signs that investors are starting to differentiate the various instruments which exist and their overall quality. As credit markets fall in a synchronous fashion, there will come a time when the most original managers will be able to find value by pairing assets of very different qualities. In a recent report to clients, JP Morgan's Global Structured Finance Research team notes that the CDO market has seen little issuance in recent weeks. Secondary activity, however, has picked up recently as bid lists are beginning to clear.

“From what I’ve gathered from a recent trip visiting US credit managers, a tightly constructed credit relative value portfolio is interesting at this juncture. We’re not looking for fundamental credit as such but principally for funds that can benefit from dislocations as well as arbitrage opportunities” opines Patrick Wills from Montier Partners, a London based hedge fund of funds. He then goes on to add “We’re also closely monitoring a handful of competent L/S high yield managers who shine in these markets.”

“The unwind of AAA CDO’s will create tremendous opportunities and we are looking for managers who can capitalize on the fixed income flows thath will result, for example ABS relative value” states Wills. It’s worth noting that 70% of the high yield market is owned by AAA investors for whom the only thing that mattered was the rating. They barely paid attention to the underlying as long as they could by insurance through monolines. Demand for lower rated tranches was easy for the banks to find in a market where spreads had become very low. When eventually monoline insurers (Ambac, MBIA) were saturated with risk, banks then kept triple these AAA tranches on their own books and in order to keep the merry-go-round going.

“This trade is not unwound completely” continues Wills and goes on to add “Investors who bought them unwrapped (e.g. Banks) will keep on suffering losses. Furthermore, the insurers themselves have a good chance of triggering a rout of distressed selling. We feel at Montier there is still a high degree of impairment risk in the AAA segment of the CDO market.

Hedge funds involved in capital structure arbitrage trades within CDO space appear well positioned. The AAA and equity tranches potentially offer more interesting returns than the mezzanine tranches where the workout periods could be prolonged.

Montier have not been comfortable with strategies that are broadly long the senior secured leveraged loan whilst buying protection through a CDS, what is a combination of a basis trade and capital structure arbitrage. The higher volatility of CDS has allowed for positive carry if the position is structured as beta-neutral i.e. less CDS hedge is required than notional of the loans. A problem arises, however, when default risks increase because not only does the hedge ratio drop but there is potential for the CDS to settle at a recovery rate which doesn't fully compensate for the loan. CDX and LCDX indices have both lost about 7 points since last October with similar volatility.

In the case of default, there is the potential for serious hedging inefficiencies when investors settle. There has been no gatekeeper in the industry looking to limit the ratio of OTC contracts to underlying. It is still unclear as to how orderly the market will be once default rates rise and everyone is scrambling for the exits at once.

“As for distressed debt funds we feel it may be a little early and the opportunities may not be as high as some investors think.” Claims Wills. “Firstly, there has been close to $30Bln already earmarked for this market from dedicated dislocation funds waiting on the sidelines. Add to that the sheer size of Sovereign Wealth Funds and their desire to invest in good franchises at bargain basement prices and you may find the returns are competed away. Secondly, default rates may be different in this in this cycle. Not only are corporate balance sheets healthier but much of the borrowing has been under light covenants making it easier for borrowers to meet their obligations.”

“In any event, it is our view at Montier that good distressed investors will want to focus on sector and idiosyncratic risk rather than simply looking at the macro risks. Good distressed managers will have a thorough sector by sector understanding and thus how companies will be affected. In any case, debt trades at recovery levels way ahead of the occurrence of the actual default, so timing of the entry point cannot be based on a peak in default rates”


Montier’s other interests in credit include:

  • Event driven credit funds. Although investors should expect some volatility, Montier see better returns in event for credit than in equity space. Financial buyout activity is obviously curtailed by the CLO market, while strategic acquisitions are harder to complete due to the greater loss of jobs at senior level.

  • US high grade mortgage spreads are very high and there could be some good opportunities on the long side for managers that understand the flows in the market.

“Central banks are more pro active and interventionist than in past cycles which means we generally favour managers that have a more active trading style” concludes Wills.

Montier Partners is a London based hedge fund of funds founded by Dominique Montier in 1996. Client portfolios are composed of hedge funds allocated across a range of investment strategies with the aim of generating competitive absolute returns with low volatility. Patrick Wills is a partner at the firm and a member of the Investment Advisory Committee.

Variance Capital Management does not recommend or distribute Montier Partners’ funds.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Story
 
January in review
 


Global hedge fund returns will be down 3.1% according to HFR’s latest data for January. It is worse than August of ’07 and supposedly the worse month for hedge funds since 1998. Before writing hedge fund managers off (some alleged industry expects claim ALL hedge funds under $10Bln will collapse in 2008), it’s worth pointing out  it took hedge funds close to 6 months for most hedge fund to turn their portfolios around in ’00 after the crash of the tech bubble. In the end though, hedge fund indices fared much better than most asset classes for the 2 years subsequent to this.

Expecting some type of January reprieve, most managers were admittedly asleep at the wheel this month. On the other hands, hedge funds are market participants and as such were bound to be affected by the current volatility. In the end, not all strategies (and managers) were created equal and, after speaking with several allocators, a fairly differentiated picture has emerged.

  • Long/Short equity managers with a long bias have suffered with funds appearing to be down between 5% and 15% for the month. The hedge funds with a variable bias which tend to move opportunistically between net long and short positions, have fared better. They’re hovering between -3% and +3%.

  • Dedicated short sellers have done well as one can imagine.

  • Global macro funds where mixed with some managers doing very well (Brevan Howard, Clarium) and others getting crushed (Drake). Historically, global macro managers usually do well in times of bifurcated expectations and higher volatility. Some who have done well had bearish yield curve steepeners on, betting on the fact that short term rates would fall. On the other hand, those who had bullish steepeners (i.e. betting on longer term rates going up) had more difficulty. Concentrated portfolios that were long gold and oil also fared well. Others have paired portfolios with exposure to both deflation and inflation…and don’t forget the quintessential short ABX/sub prime trade and its derivatives (i.e. monoline insurers) which seems to be alive and well.

  • Commodities traders had an interesting month: they were up at the beginning, lost money during the month and now positive. Interestingly, commodity markets corrected with the equity markets (and most risky assets) but bounced back sometimes 3 times as much with each relief rally.

  • CTAs did fairly well on both the short term and longer term (Winton is up approx 3% for the month).

  • Quant equity and GTAAs, aside from the odd exception, had a miserable month.

  • Converts and vol traders (long vol): strong numbers are to be expected (in the 2% to 5% range for January) with most managers quite positive about the outlook (1)  Rates are coming in which is good for converts. (2)Volatility is up and should stay there for some time (3) Credit spreads are finally interesting. (4) Capital markets are shut down and corporates who desperately need to borrow will tap into this market.

  • Multi-strats: results were variable (-3% to +3%). Lost in credit but made money on some of their shorts as well as converts.

  • Event driven: another bad month for the strategy with some throwing in the towel on the strategy altogether. Most were long equity in some ways with the odd deal falling apart (i.e. Alliance data falling 46% on the back of Blackstone’s problems).

  • Credit: not the best month with most funds down quite a bit. Some funds involved in private lending had mild losses but see the outlook quite rosy as markets are shut to most corporates and HF have become lenders of last resort. Leverage loan investors are suffering from mark to market in one of the most difficult environments (deleveraging, high yield investors running for the hills, overhang of hundreds of billions in LBO deals).



 

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Story
  Convertible arbitrage funds should prove popular in a volatile market.  
 


We had made a quite compelling case for the convertible arbitrage managers and gamma traders in our October ’07 newsletter . Since then, market fluctuations seem to have given us even more comfort in that call. As a matter of fact, David Rich who ran Marathon’s global convertible bond fund in New York for practically 5 years and recently launched his own dedicated effor in converts feels we’re in a very similar configuration as 2002. At the time, convertible bond managers could do no wrong with the HFRI Convertible Arbitrage Index up 9.05%. Their success that year was to lead to the ultimate demise of the strategy. Once investors caught on, walls of money started flowing in competing away most returns. Och Ziff, in the midst of the “high yield meltdown” of ’02, would have probably not survived had it not been for their converts exposure.

According to David, the main reasons for the similarities between ’02 and ’08 are the following:

  • Short term rates are coming in which is good for converts. The US yield curve will probably steepen some more as the fed’s efforts to shore up liquidity in financial markets ultimately leads to some inflationary tension down the road, leading longer term rates to go up.

  • Volatility is up. Most days since the beginning of the moth have been up or down days by at least 1% with no catalyst in sight to see volatility coming down. Structurally, the macro outlook is mixed leading to bifurcated views on the markets with binary outcomes…and volatility usually stays very high in those environments. Until the employment data actually shows us the financial crisis has fed through the economy or inversely that the “sky is blue” scenario prevails, expect volatility to stay high.

  • Credit spreads are finally interesting. At L+400/500, investors are finally getting paid to take on credit risk.

  • Capital markets are shut down and corporates who need to borrow will tap into this market. Premiums will be low, higher coupons hedgeable credit end up being long a cheap option.

  • Near term you can expect financial institutions to be the first ones to tap in to this market with limited success. The sheer size of some of these placements (i.e Citigroup’s $7Bln placement) combined with the market place’s limited appetite, will force them to price them very attractively.

On the other hand, it feels it may be too early to participate fully in the bank loan market. Even though there is value for in some papers, it will be very difficult to make money before another 6 months.

  • Yields too low for some high yield players which have moved away from that market. As Libor goes down with fed’s funds, it’s been enough to create a mass exodus.

  • Huge overhang of LBO deals from banks.

  • CLO funds are shut down or aggressively deleveraging, putting pressure on bids.

  • Redemptions levels are high from credit investors and gates are coming up.


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